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ABSTRACT. We seek to examine the manner in which either the EU member states of France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden
or parts of them, such as the country of England in the UK or the Flemish Region in Belgium, deal with the distributional effects of
the flood risk management strategies prevention, defense, and mitigation. Measures carried out in each of these strategies can cause
preflood harm, as in the devaluation of property or loss of income. However, different member states and authorities address this harm
in different ways. A descriptive overview of the different compensation regimes in the field of flood risk management is followed by an
analysis of these differences and an explanation of what may cause them, such as the geographical differences that lead to differences
in the way that they interfere with private rights and the dominant legal principles that underlie compensation regimes. An elaborated
compensation regime could lead to more equitable and legitimate flood risk management because the burdens are fairly spread and all
interests—including those of injured parties—are considered in the decision-making process. Our aim is to stimulate the hardly existent
discussion on the financial harm that is caused by measures to prevent floods (preflood), in addition to the already existing discussion
on the ex post flood distributional effects.
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INTRODUCTION
The distributional effects of climate change adaptation and flood
risk management have been the subject of many papers. Most of
these address the issue from an economic perspective (Flores and
Thacher 2002) or a geographical perspective (Adger et al. 2005,
Solecki et al. 2011). Social scientists have also addressed this issue
(Mazmanian et al. 2013). Loss can be seen as a distributional
effect (Fullerton 2009). The distributional effects of floods (ex
post) are discussed in the literature (Tapsell et al. 2002, Penning-
Rowsell et al. 2005). Our aim is to stimulate the discussion on the
financial loss caused by measures to prevent floods (preflood).
This issue is of interest not only to economists and social scientists,
but also to legal scholars. Flood risk management is an important
agent in causing distributional effects. Most literature addresses
flood risk management as an element of adaptation to climate
change (Bodansky 1999, Tol and Verheyen 2004, Mace 2006,
Driessen and van Rijswick 2011, Keessen et al. 2013, Tennekes et
al. 2014) or the damage resulting from floods (ex post), but the
distributional effects of preventive flood risk management
(preflood) have hardly been discussed yet (Tapsell et al. 2002,
Penning-Rowsell et al. 2005, Merz et al. 2010, Wilby and Keenan
2012, van Doorn-Hoekveld 2014, van den Broek 2015). To acquire
insights into this aspect, we address the compensation
mechanisms used in several EU member states for one specific
distributional effect of flood risk management: the lawfully
caused harm resulting from measures taken to prevent floods
(preflood compensation). The compensation of lawfully caused
loss is also called “no-fault liability.” This may be available even
though in the case of wrongful conduct of a public authority it
may also give rise to compensation (Engelhard et al. 2014). This
specific topic, however, is outside the scope of this paper.  
Adger et al. (2005) have defined criteria for successful climate
change adaptation: equity and legitimacy being two of them.
Specifically relevant to the criterion of equity is a fair distribution
of adverse effects. We examine the ways in which distributional
effects of preventive flood risk management measures are dealt
with in England, France, the Flemish Region in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. The question that needs to be
answered is, How can the legal similarities and differences of the
no-fault liability compensation regimes regarding flood
prevention be explained? By prevention, we mean all measures
needed to prevent a flood from occurring. It encompasses, among
others, spatial measures, flood defense or flood protection
measures, and mitigation measures. Understanding these
differences is necessary to gain insight into best practices that
might be implemented in the different countries, which are all
encountering similar challenges that go with the distributional
effects stemming from the prevention, defense, and mitigation
strategies. It also enriches the already existing literature that
addresses distributional effects of flood risk management. The
results can be used as a starting point for comparative research
on government liability for harm caused by preventive measures
in general, such as animal diseases or climate change mitigation
measures.  
We first describe the underlying principles of the legal framework
in the six countries regarding the relevant compensation regimes
for lawfully caused harm. Then we analyze the compensation
regimes themselves by elaborating on three concrete measures,
namely (1) a dike strengthening, (2) the creation of a retention or
water storage area, and (3) a spatial planning measure. These three
measures have a preventative character, which can cause harm to
a limited group of people and simultaneously protect a large
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group of—sometimes different—people. The distributional
effects are unequally spread. In order to achieve equity and
increase the legitimacy of the measures proposed, some countries
compensate the loss caused by the realization of these measures,
while other countries oblige the injured parties to bear the costs
themselves. In the third part of this paper, we explain these
differences between the countries.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The main concepts used are represented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Envisaged relationship between main concepts used.
Just as a flood can cause harm, the actions taken to prevent a
flood can cause harm. In most cases, public authorities can realize
measures, such as those previously mentioned, in order to protect
a part of the country or a specific area—e.g., a densely populated
urban area—from flooding, so that a larger group of people will
benefit from this action. At the same time, a limited group of
people may face adverse effects from these measures, such as
devaluation of property as a result of restrictions on the use of
their land, the restriction of their view, a loss of income because
of the restrictions on the use of land or the loss of harvest, or
even the loss of property in the case of expropriation. These
adverse effects constitute the “loss” or “harm.”  
Loss can be caused by a lawful action. Decisions and actions taken
by the authorities for the common good, such as the designation
and creation of a retention area, can be considered to be lawfully
undertaken; all substantive and procedural rules have been
applied correctly, there has been a balance of interests, and the
decision is properly motivated. In many cases, all interested parties
consider the decision or action the right thing to do, even those
who suffer the loss. Since there is no wrongful conduct, in most
cases civil or criminal law does not contain compensation clauses.
However, most of the studied countries do have some provisions
to compensate the persons in the case of lawfully caused harm.
These provisions are based on general principles of law.  
A legal compensation regime is the specific regime that is used for
the compensation of loss. This differs per country and depends
on the underlying general legal principles. The solidarity principle,
the principle of the protection of property rights, and the principle
of égalité devant les charges publiques [equality before public
burdens] are relevant in the studied cases. The legal compensation
regime differs per country, such as the way the compensation is
designed and which authority is competent to award damages.  
A competent authority is the administrative authority at the
national, regional, or local level that has the power to make
decisions regarding flood risk management or to realize measures,
and that is responsible for these decisions or the realization
thereof. It is possible that the authority that is competent for the
realization of the loss-causing measure is not the same as the
authority that is responsible for paying for the compensation of
loss. The competences of authorities are laid down in legislation,
and the precise division of powers may differ per country.  
A dike, also called an embankment, is a hard flood defense
structure that offers protection to its hinterland from flooding by
a river, a lake, or the sea. The structure can be strengthened
through broadening and/or heightening. When a dike is relocated,
it is replaced—or rebuilt—at a different location. Although
realization and relocation are not the same as strengthening, it is
also discussed here because the harm is similar. These measures
entail the need for more space for or around the structure, which
may oblige landowners and other rights holders nearby to face
disturbances from the surroundings, loss of free view. This can
lead to devaluation of property. In other cases, more space is
needed to realize the measure, which may determine that the
authority must deprive individuals of their land (expropriation).
For expropriation and regulation of property, different regimes
are applied (Mountfield 2002). Deprivation of possessions leads
to compensation based on the market value of the property in all
studied countries. The difference between expropriation and the
regulation of property is that in the latter case, the ownership is
not shifted.  
In times of high water discharges, a retention area—often
established on private property—is used to temporarily store
water to avoid flooding elsewhere. Harm that might arise consists
of loss of ownership of property, devaluation of property, and
loss of income because of the reduction of accessibility or
possibilities to use the land for economic purposes.  
We also focus on a specific spatial planning measure that can
prevent flooding: the prohibition to build in, or develop, a flood-
prone area. The harm may consist of a restriction on the owner’s
use of the land in that area; i.e., they may not build or develop
the land as they might wish, which may lead to devaluation of the
property. A prerequisite for the existence of loss is that there was
no prohibition in the area concerned before its designation as a
flood-prone area.  
The cause of harm is the factual deed, measure, or governmental
action, or the written decision in which the action or decision is
announced, depending on the legal regime in a specific country.
The cause of loss is of crucial importance for compensation. It is
necessary to establish the direct connection—causality—between
the loss and the cause of loss (conditio sine qua non). If  this
connection cannot be established, no compensation is granted.
The injured party can be an individual or a company who suffers
loss as result of the measure.  
The basic assumption of the égalité principle is that compensation
is granted to those who have endured a disproportionately large
burden or loss caused by activities pursued by the administration
for the common good (Fairgrieve 2003:144). The égalité principle
has some aspects in common with the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights regarding, in particular, the
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First Protocol Article 1 of the European Convention of Human
Rights (ECHR), but differs on others. The égalité principle offers
more protection of property rights than the regime of the ECHR
(Barkhuysen and Tjepkema 2006, Tjepkema 2013).  
The principle of equity is important in many fields of law. “Equity
is often referred to as fairness, or a fair judgment or
reasonableness” (Lindhout 2015:21). Equity is multifaceted, one
of the facets being distributive justice, which refers to the
allocation of benefits and costs in a society (Fraser 2009, Di
Gregorio et al. 2013). This also relates to fair burden sharing,
which is connected to compensation, because when the damages
of injured parties are awarded, the burdens are considered to be
more equally spread (Thomas and Twyman 2005, Driessen and
van Rijswick 2011). Compensation may thus lead to more
equitable flood risk management.  
The principle of legitimacy is another relevant legal principle.
Buijze (2013:42–43) defines legitimacy as the extent to which
“people have a fair chance to exert influence over decision-
making, and people agree that an authority should exist because
they are convinced that it brings them a net benefit.” van Buuren
et al. (2014:1023) put it as follows: “It is government’s duty to use
powers only for the reasons for which they are granted, to avoid
the abuse of power, and to create a fair, reasonable, and
proportionate balance of public and private interests.” These
(participation and acceptability) are two of different facets of this
principle. Also accountability, transparency, access to
information, and procedural justice are part of this principle (Ek
et al. 2016b). By taking into account the harm to some parties,
not only are the first three facets of this principle addressed, but
it also helps to further transparency and accountability, and thus
the loss-causing decision might be considered to be more
legitimate than it would be if  damages are not awarded.  
The principle of solidarity is also important because it underpins
the compensation regimes of different countries. De Beer and
Koster (2009) have introduced the so called one-sided and two-
sided solidarity. They define one-sided solidarity as “assisting
someone else without expecting anything in return” and two-sided
as “[when someone] expects, on balance, to benefit just as much
from others as they themselves are contributing”(see also
Steinvorth 1999). They also differentiate between voluntary and
compulsory solidarity. Voluntary solidarity is the case when
people help others on their own initiative. Compulsory solidarity
is organized through the state (De Beer and Koster 2009:12). In
flood risk management, one can find a mix of the different types
of solidarity (Keessen et al., unpublished manuscript).
METHODS
We take a legal approach. In legal studies, a well-known method
is legal comparison (Ancel 1971, Gorlé et al. 1991, Bussani and
Mattei 2012). It is used to elaborate on the differences and
similarities of legal systems in various countries. The aim of a
legal comparison is not only to gain insight into different legal
systems but also to understand how legal systems function. This
may enable the understanding of, for example, a specific policy
instrument in the legal context in which it is used. Moreover, this
may help to improve or reform the legal system and to achieve an
optimization and harmonization of law, which may facilitate the
implementation of European directives, such as the Floods
Directive, in a comparable way. Finally, this may also improve the
implementation of flood risk management strategies in
transboundary river basins. In order to get a comprehensive
overview of specific legal regimes, an indepth analysis of primary
and secondary sources—domestic legislation, jurisprudence,
doctrine, and policy documents—must be conducted. This
method is characterized as a desk-study approach. By studying
not only the legislation of the central government but also
decentralized legislation, guidance documents, policy, and case
law, this method gives a broad impression of a specific aspect of
a country’s legal system.  
The legal systems of five countries and one region within a federal
country are studied. The countries Belgium, England, France, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Poland are part of the consortium of
the STAR-FLOOD-project. For the purpose of this paper, these
areas were chosen because their preflood compensation regimes
show interesting similarities and differences. The countries differ
institutionally, from highly centralized (England) to decentralized
(Sweden) to a federal state (Belgium), and differ from common
law (England) to civil law (the other countries), and have some
underlying principles in common. Also, the geographical aspects
of the countries selected differ highly from densely populated
(Flanders and the Netherlands) to sparsely populated (Sweden).
Poland differs from a historical point of view, as it is the only
country with a Communist background, and the current legal
system is still developing. These reasons add to the representative
character of the lessons learned in the broader context. The
Belgian situation differs from the other countries. In Belgium,
competences with regard to environmental issues, water
management, and flood risk management pertain to the three
regions: the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region, and the
Brussels Capital Region. These three regions have thus developed
their own sets of legislation and policies in this regard. For the
sake of comparison, the Flemish Region will constitute the
territorial unit of analysis.  
In order to explain the differences and similarities, not only must
the legal compensation regimes be studied but also the way in
which the general regime is applied in concrete situations. We
consider three typical preventive measures: a dike strengthening,
a creation of a retention area, and a spatial planning measure.
These three measures have been chosen because they represent
different preventive flood risk management strategies that are
carried out by administrative authorities with responsibilities in
the field of flood risk management. To answer the research
question, it would not be logical to consider mitigation measures
that have to be realized by private parties because in that case the
harm would not be caused by the administration and therefore
will not be compensated by them. Another reason for these three
measures is that in principle they lawfully cause loss to private
parties because in most cases they affect private property. The
final reason is that other similar measures—e.g., the construction
of a dam—could be included under one of these three measures.  
The scrutiny of the three measures is necessary to achieve an
insight into the explanation of the general compensation regimes
regarding flood risk management. Only when we know how the
legal compensation regime is applied in a concrete situation can
we explain properly how a system works in practice.
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RESULTS
Principles
General legal principles underlie specific legal regimes or rules
(Dainow 1966, Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo 2007). It is relevant
to address the dominant principles because they can constitute
the explanation of how a specific regime is established and how
rules are applied. In this section, the dominant principles of
compensation regimes are described.  
Property rights are protected by law in all the examined countries.
In Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Poland, the protection
is codified in the Constitution and in the Civil Code. In Sweden,
it is codified in the Instrument of Government, one of the four
constitutional instruments. In England, it is a long-standing
principle of Common Law that no one should be deprived of their
property by a public authority against their will unless Parliament
has expressly provided for such action, which is in the public
interest, and compensation should normally be available from the
state (Blackstone Commentaries 1778, and confirmed most
recently in the UK Supreme Court case of R [Sainsburys
Supermarkets] v Wolverhampton CC, [2010] UKSC 20). The
countries are all party to the European Convention on Human
Rights, which also aims to protect property rights; the provisions
of the ECHR Articles 6, 8, and especially Protocol 1 Article 1 are
consequently applicable.  
The protection of this right commonly entails that if  the right is
breached, proper—and in most cases, full—compensation must
be granted. Where expropriation is necessary—i.e., land is needed
to realize a measure—all countries provide compensation.
Compensation for expropriation has a reparative function: the
person affected should not be left in a worse position than those
who can avoid it (Ljungman and Stjernquist 1968, Howarth 2002,
Waline 2007, Leonski 2009, Ignatowicz and Stefaniuk 2012,
Pauliat 2012, Radwański and Olejniczak 2012, Hostiou 2013,
Bengtsson 2015, Garlicki 2015).  
In England, the Common Law principle is that the state must be
authorized by a specific piece of law, such as the water or planning
legislation, which then allows the public authority, with the
Minister’s approval, and in the public interest, to take control of
the use of the land or property, provided it normally compensates
the owner or occupiers. The Human Rights Act 1998 also makes
it clear that all public authorities must respect articles of the
ECHR. These are, consequently, a part of the law. The calculation
of the amount of compensation is based on the equivalence
principle; i.e., that the person suffering damages must be no worse
or better off  financially than before the Authority’s action (DCLG
2011). Generally, the amount of compensation awarded is for the
loss arising from the difference between the market value before
and after the work is done (Howarth 2002).  
In Flanders, there is no comprehensive no-fault liability
compensation scheme with clear-cut criteria and thresholds
applicable. Flanders has developed a whole array of flood risk
management instruments, ensuing mainly from the 2003 Decree
Integrated Water Policy—for example, the water test, signal areas,
and expropriation. All of these policy instruments have, be it
directly or not, an effect on how citizens enjoy their properties
and how the landscape is categorized in terms of planning
destinations. Most of these provide for some sort of
compensation. The application of the égalité principle to
environmental and spatial planning law and practice was not
considered until recent judgments by the Court of Cassation and
the Constitutional Court. In its 2010 judgment, the Court of
Cassation stated that a citizen might be granted compensation
for burdens that are greater than those justified by the public
interest, even when there is no explicit legal basis for this
compensation (Court of Cassation of 24 June 2010, C.06.0415.
N). In 2012, the Constitutional Court found that the equality of
burden sharing generally applies to easements of public interests
(Constitutional Court, 19 April 2102, 55/2012). This judgment by
the Court broadened the scope of the égalité principle to
restrictions of property in the public interest in general (Van
Hoorick 2012). It is expected that the principle might be applied
for preflood harm as well, but currently no cases have been
brought up for court.  
In France, property rights are guaranteed by the Declaration of
Human and Civil Rights of 26 August 1789 (art. 17), which is
part of the constitutional block. Yet, this right is directly
counterbalanced by another principle: the public interest,
whereby the administration can infringe property rights (Truchet
1999). This principle is defined by the administration, under the
control of the administrative judge, in order to leave a margin of
maneuver. If  the infringement is excessive (i.e., expropriation), a
just and prior indemnity has to be paid to the landowner. Yet, in
case of a low infringement, the administration does not have to
compensate through an easement restraining the land use. This is
a specific application of the égalité principle, according to which
citizens have to bear all the loss caused by the administration
through, for instance, a non aedificandi easement contained in a
Plan de Prévention du Risques Inondation (PPRI) (Council of
State, 29 December 2004, Sté d'aménagement des coteaux de Saint-
Blaine, n° 257804). However, the administrative judge considers
that compensation is required if  the loss is abnormal and special
(for public utility easements based on the Environmental Code;
see Council of State, 3 July 1998, Bitouzet). The Parliament has
also created a restrictive compensation regime for urban
easements in planning documents (Urban Code, art. L. 105-1).
Thus, compensation of loss caused by preflood measures is
exceptional. Only in the case of expropriation, (full)
compensation is granted.  
Dutch flood risk management is characterized by the principle of
solidarity (Keessen et al., unpublished manuscript). Landholders
pay for the protection of the area of land in which they live or
have their property, and which is managed by a regional water
authority (van Rijswick and Havekes 2012, Nehmelman 2014,
Wiering et al. 2015). The state also partly contributes financially
to the construction and maintenance of primary flood defense
structures (Explanatory Memorandum of the Water Act. The
underlying rationale is that all Dutch citizens benefit from a safe
country, so they should all contribute to keeping the Netherlands
habitable. This approach can be explained by the fact that large
parts of the Netherlands (about 66%) are extremely vulnerable to
flooding and that a serious flood would cause harm to the society
as a whole (Kaufmann et al. 2016). The thus provided solidarity
regards not only financial contributions (taxes) to water
management, because it ensures that all taxpayers contribute to
flood risk management, but also has an equality aspect because
all Dutch inhabitants are granted a certain level of safety. This
Ecology and Society 21(4): 26
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss4/art26/
can be considered a compulsory two-sided solidarity (Keessen et
al., unpublished manuscript). Closely connected to this rationale
is the preflood compensation regime, which is developed mainly
within the framework of water management. Loss resulting from
measures taken in the field of flood protection is usually
compensated. Mainly developed within the framework of water
management, loss resulting from measures taken in the field of
flood protection is usually compensated. The Dutch have adopted
the égalité principle to create a generally quite well-balanced
preflood compensation regime (OECD 2014, Wiering et al. 2015).
The core of this principle is to compensate those who have
endured a disproportionately large burden or loss caused by
activities pursued by the administration for the common good
(Fairgrieve 2003:144, Tjepkema 2010, van Doorn-Hoekveld
2014). The principle is codified in legislation, such as the Water
Act (paragraph 7.3), the Spatial Planning Act (paragraph 6.1),
and the General Administrative Law Act (title 4.5, not yet into
force). Arguably, a consequence of this system is that the public–
private divide is out of balance. Compensation is fully the
responsibility of the government, and private parties have almost
no responsibility of their own to prevent floods or to undertake
recovery measures. This differs from countries with a more
elaborated ex post compensation regime, such as Belgium,
England, and France. In the case of private insurance systems,
private parties are more likely to take preventive measures
themselves (Suykens et al., 2016). This also has consequences for
flood risk management in general, because at first glance, people
assume that there is no need to gain awareness of flood risks in
their vicinity.  
Poland takes a different approach to the issue and places
compensation within the proportionality principle. In Poland, the
principle of subsidiarity is laid down in the Constitution, and the
principle of proportionality is derived from Article 31 paragraph
3 of the Constitution. Restrictions on the exercise of
constitutional freedom and rights with regard to flood prevention
can be established but only by a form of an Act and only if  it is
necessary to prevent or reverse the consequences of a flood. With
regard to ownership, this principle is further strengthened by
Article 21 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which states,
“Expropriation may be allowed solely for public purposes and for
just compensation,” and in Article 64 paragraph 3, which
stipulates, “Property may only be limited by law and only to the
extent that it does not violate the essence of property rights.”  
In Sweden, compensation resulting from lawful actions is
distinguished from the one resulting from unlawful actions
(Bengtsson 1991, Hellner and Radetzki 2014). The protection of
property rights is of most relevance for the topic at hand. In order
to satisfy the public interest, the constitutional provision on the
protection of property applies in the case of both expropriation
and restriction of use of land and buildings. In relation to
expropriation, the provision states that the individual must be
guaranteed “full compensation for his or her loss” (Ch. 2, s. 15,
par. 2 Instrument of Government). Compensation in the case of
restrictions to the use of land is constitutionally ensured insofar
as the restrictions entail that “the ongoing land use in the area in
question is substantially impaired” or result in “considerable loss
in relation to the value of the area in question”; the level of
compensation in these cases is determined “in accordance with
principles laid down in law” (Ch. 2, s. 15, par. 2 Instrument of
Government). There is, however, no constitutionally protected
right to compensation in the case of restrictions that are grounded
on the “protection of human health or the environment or on
safety reasons” (Ch. 2, s. 15, par. 3 Instrument of Government).
Here, the right to compensation is thus regulated entirely by law,
and the principle is that no compensation is due (see Government
Bill 2009/10:80). In summary, even when the property is not
transferred but the freedom to the use of property is otherwise
affected by a specific measure, compensation may be due in
Sweden.
Compensation regimes
Dike strengthening (Table 1)
Under the so-called English Compensation Code, a large body of
statutes, case law, delegated legislation, and government
guidances, it is possible that the acquiring authority (AA), which
includes local authorities, the Environment Agency, or, where they
exist, Internal Drainage Boards, will be forced to compensate the
owner or long lessee of the land (including buildings) for the
compulsory purchase of the land or the loss of certain rights over
the use of land, including buildings. Especially important here
are the powers of the Environment Agency to organize the
compulsory purchase of land or rights over the land, termed
Flood Risk Management Works Orders, acquired for flood-
related work (S 154 and 165 and Schedule 19 of the Water
Resources Act 1991 [as amended]). Local authorities have similar
powers (S266 Town and County Planning Act 1990). The Internal
Drainage Boards again have powers similar to those of the local
authorities in relation to flood prevention measures in nonmain
rivers under the Land Drainage Act 1991.  
These legislative provisions provide that, subject to a Minister’s
approval and provided it is in the economic or environmental
interest of the area, the AA has wide powers to order works or
acquire land or interests over the land. The AA may also have to
compensate for the loss of rights over the land rather than outright
purchase under S7 and S10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1968,
and where harm is caused by blight or disturbance, under the
latter Act or S5 of the Land Compensation Act 1965. Under the
Planning Act 2008, where there is a development of a Nationally
Significant Infrastructure Project, such as a new airport or major
road, the projects will be authorized under this Act, and so will
the compensation.  
France has a very complex system of ownership of dikes, as dikes
may be owned by private owners, an association of private owners,
a public authority (state, region, department, commune, public
establishment of intercommunity cooperation), or an association
of public bodies. Nowadays, for 45% of the dikes, the owner is
unknown (CEPRI 2008:45). These are called “orphan dikes”
(Larrue et al. 2016:160). In order to strengthen a dike,
expropriation or a public easement is necessary. In this case,
different types of actions are possible:  
1. expropriation from private landlords in order to have no
constructions behind dikes and to control the land; 
2. implementation of urban planning’s easements (the norms
contained in the urban planning documents [Local Urban
Plan]) and public utility easements (are the norms contained
in other legislations [Environmental Code]) in order to partly
control the area and the dike; and 
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Table 1. Dike strengthening.
 
England Flanders France The Netherlands Poland Sweden
Competent
authority for
realization of
dike
strengthening
Environment Agency
or Lead Local Flood
Authorities or Inland
Drainage Boards
Regional water
managers
Private owners,
association of private
owners
Public authority
(state, region,
department,
commune, public
establishment of
intercommunity
cooperation
association of public
bodies)
Regional or
national water
manager
Director of
Regional Water
Management
Board
Provincial
Authority of
Drainage,
Irrigation and
Infrastructure
Revision of permit
can be sought by
Swedish
Environmental
Protection Agency,
Swedish Agency for
Marine and Water
Management,
Kammarkollegiet,
Swedish Civil
Contingencies
Agency, County
Administrative
Board, municipality
(in certain cases)
Competent
authority for
compensation
The authority that is
also competent for the
realization of the
damage-causing
decision
The authority that is
also competent for the
realization of the
damage-causing
decision
The authority that is
also competent for the
realization of the
damage-causing
decision
The authority that
is also competent
for the realization
of the damage-
causing decision
Regional Water
Management
Board
The permit holder
may have to
compensate third
parties.
Compensation is
decided by the court.
Cause of loss The actual time of
notice or entry on
land or vesting
declaration for the
Compulsory Purchase
Order or General
Flood Risk
Management Works
The project plan Administrative police
decision
Public easement
Administrative
decision related to
public works
Declaration of public
utility
Project plan Project plan Revision of water
operation permit
Loss Loss of value of land
acquired
Loss of interests over
the land
Blight from the works
Disturbance
Costs of relocation or
extinguishing
Home loss—extra
10% of value
Devaluation of
property
Partial or full
dispossession of
ownership
Dispossession of
ownership
Restriction of
ownership right: leads
to a devaluation of
property and a
possible loss of
income
Devaluation of
property
Loss of income
Dispossession of
ownership
Devaluation of
property
Loss of income
Dispossession of
ownership
Dispossession of
ownership total or in
part; damages to
another’s property
caused by the
modification of the
structure
Injured party Owners, leaseholders,
some tenants
Property owners
Businesses
Property owners,
owners of real
property rights and
“personal” rights
(e.g., tenant)
Businesses
Property owners
Businesses
Property owners
Businesses
Landowners
Holders of special
rights
Compensation
regime
Equivalence Expropriation
Égalité principle
Expropriation
Compensation of
public easement
Compensation in case
of public works
damages
Égalité principle
Expropriation
Expropriation For dispossession:
expropriation
principles
For damages: tort
law principles
Relevant
principle
Equivalence
plus 10% for home
loss and extra
payments for
businesses and
agricultural owners in
certain circumstances
Protection of
property rights:
Égalité principle
Protection of
property rights
Equality vis-à-vis
government
encumbrances
Égalité principle
Protection of
property rights
Solidarity principle
Protection of
property rights
Proportionality
principle
Subsidiarity
principle
Protection of
property rights
Compensation
Who benefits
from the
damaging-
causing
measures
Private parties living
and working in the
protected area
Inhabitants of area
protected by dike
Private parties living
and working in the
protected area
Private parties
living and working
in the protected
area
Private parties
living and working
in the protected
area
Municipalities in
protected areas
Persons in the area
protected by the
structure
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3. adoption of administrative police measures in order to force
the owner to do the necessary maintenance works. 
In the first case, expropriated parties will be fully compensated.
However, devaluation of property and a possible loss of income
will not be automatically compensated. When an urban planning’s
easement is acquired, no compensation is provided, except if  the
very restrictive conditions contained in the article L. 105-1 Urban
Code are met. The justification is that compensating all urban
planning’s easements would be an important constraint on land
use planning (Ministerial Reply, Official Journal of the French
Assemblée Nationale, 16 July 1977, p. 4741). In the case of a public
utility easement, compensation is possible.  
The Flemish and Dutch cases are quite similar. The Dutch
regional water authorities and Flemish water managers are
responsible for strengthening flood defense structures and are the
competent authority to compensate the resulting loss. In the
Netherlands, injured parties can ask for compensation based on
the codified égalité principle (Water Act). Recent Flemish case
law has applied the égalité principle to restriction of property
rights ensuing from a lawful governmental Act, but this has not
yet been consolidated in the legal regime regarding dike
strengthening. The Dike Decree states that regional water
managers should compensate for loss of value of the property,
and can be obligated to buy or expropriate it (Dike Decree 1996).
In the Flemish Region, expropriation is governed by legislation
and gives right to compensation, just as in the Netherlands.  
In Poland, compensation for flood protection expropriation is
granted mainly by the Special Rules for the Implementation of
Investments Act. It regulates acquisition of land required for
flood protection constructions and it facilitates the construction
process. It is a lex specialis to the Real Estate Management Act.
Besides expropriation, authorities could also compensate loss
according to the contract responsibility, although it is unlikely
that authorities would sign a contract with a particular individual
or company with such provisions.  
In Sweden, the construction and alteration of structures in water
areas, as well as measures taken to provide permanent protection
against water, are considered “water operations,” and thus require
a permit (Ch. 11, s. 2, 3, and 9 Environmental Code [1998:808]).
Water structures can be constructed and consequently owned by
private or public persons. The structure is owned by either the
owner of the land on which the structure stands or the holder of
right (e.g., a special right of coercion) on the basis of which the
structure has been constructed on land belonging to another.
Landowners can even come together in joint property associations
to share the benefits and costs associated with a defensive
structure. The owner is obliged to maintain the structure and is
not compensated for the connected costs; if  someone other than
the owner of the water structure has obtained a right to use the
structure, both are in principle responsible for the maintenance
(Ch. 11, s. 17 Environmental Code).  
For example, if  the owner of a structure wants to strengthen or
broaden it, they will generally have to obtain a permit to do so.
The supervisory authority (normally a County Administrative
Board) may issue orders and prohibitions on safety-increasing
measures, but only in relation to safety classified dams (Ch. 26,
s. 9 Environmental Code). Moreover, certain public authorities
have the power to seek a revision of an existing permit, with the
purpose of, for example, improving the safety of the structure
(Ch. 24, ss. 5 and 7 Environmental Code). The revision of water
operation permits by initiative of authorities is however rather
unusual (see for example, SOU 2014:35).  
If  to carry out a strengthening measure, the permit holder takes
possession, or otherwise damages another person’s property, they
will have to compensate that person (Ch. 31, ss. 16 and 17
Environmental Code). This is also applicable in case the measure
is taken on the basis of a permit revision initiated by a public
authority (Ch. 31, ss. 20 para. 2–3 and 21, para. 2 Environmental
Code). The Expropriation Act (1972:791) is principally applicable
in matters of compensation in connection with water operations
permits and revisions (Ch. 31, s. 2 Environmental Code).
Bengtsson et al. (2015) explain, however, that expropriation rules
are applicable in case of compulsory purchase or comparable
means of taking possession over another’s land; compensation in
case of other damages instead follows tort law rules (cf. Bengtsson
2010). Compensation is paid only for the loss that remains after
the permit holder has taken preventive or remedial measures (Ch.
31, s. 16 Environmental Code).  
In cases where a permit revision initiated by public authorities
results in, for example, a loss of water or a restriction in the permit
holder’s right to regulate the water flow, the authority that has
sought the revision may have to compensate the permit holder;
however, “no compensation is due to the extent the loss or
restriction can be deemed an improvement of the safety of the
water structure” (Ch. 31, ss. 20 para. 1 and 21 para. 1
Environmental Code). Since this would be the case when the
revision seeks only a strengthening of the structure, it is likely that
no damages would be awarded to the permit holder. Even when
compensation is due to the permit holder, the compensation is
not full (see Ch. 31, s. 22 Environmental Code).
Creation of a retention area (Table 2)
In England, retention areas may be created by either the
Environment Agency under water legislation or by Local
Authorities under the planning regime; more usually they are
created by negotiated agreements and compensation as under the
legislation if  a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) had been used.
The compensation regime, which is applicable for loss as a result
of a dike strengthening project, is also applied for harm caused
by the creation of a retention area. There is no compensation for
the designation of such areas in the Local Plan—only if  it is
actually used as a retention area and causes harm (R Lindley v
East Riding CC [2016] UKUT 6).  
In France, retention areas can be created through a water
management plan, such as the Water Management Master Plan
(schéma directeur d'aménagement et de gestion des eaux
[SDAGE]) or Local Water Management Plan (schéma
d'aménagement et de gestion des eaux [SAGE]), or through other
public utility easements, such as a temporary water retention zone
(ZRTECR). In the last case, compensation can be obtained by a
private arrangement between the public body and the private
owner, or if  that is not possible, it can be fixed by the expropriation
judge. The Environmental Code clearly states that compensation
is possible only if  the public utility easement creates a material,
direct, and certain injury (art. L. 211-12 Environmental Code).
Yet, if  the retention area is not created on the basis of this legal
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Table 2. Creation of a retention area.
 
England Flanders France The Netherlands Poland Sweden
Competent
authority for
realization of
retention area
Environment
Agency
Lead Local Flood
Authorities
Inland Drainage
Boards
The water managers
(regional,
provincial,
municipal)
State, local
authorities, and
intercommunality
bodies
Regional water
manager (national
water manager)
Regional Director
of Water
Management Board
Municipality
Competent
authority for
compensation
The authority that
is also competent
for the realization
of the damage-
causing decision
The initiative taker
(public authority)
that is mentioned in
the water
management plan
The authority that
is also competent
for the realization
of the loss-causing
decision
The authority that
is also competent
for the realization
of the loss-causing
decision
Provincial governor The authority that
is also competent
for taking of the
loss-causing
decision
Cause of loss The actual time of
notice or entry on
land or vesting
declaration for the
Compulsory
Purchase Order or
General Flood Risk
Management
Works
Spatial zoning plan
(designating the
retention area)
Project plan
(activating the
floodplain)
Activation of the
area (inundation)
Water management
plan (Water
Management
Master Plan, Local
Water Management
Plan)
Administrative
decision of the state
(e.g., public
easements, Projet
d'IntérÃªt Général,
Déclaration d
‘Utilité Publique)
Ledger + spatial
zoning plan
(designating the
retention area)
Project plan
(realization of area)
Duty to tolerate
(inundation of area)
Municipal spatial
zoning plan
(designating the
retention area)
Project plan
(realiation of area)
Duty to tolerate
Water operation
permit
Loss Loss of value of
land acquired
Loss of interests
over the land
Blight from the
works
Disturbance
Costs of relocation
or extinguishing
Home loss—extra
10% of value
Dispossession of
property
(expropriation)
Loss of income for
users of agricultural
land and forest
lands when
floodplain is
activated
Devaluation of
property
(restrictions of use
through public
easements)
Dispossession of
ownership
Restriction of
ownership right
Real damage to
property (loss of
harvest)
Devaluation of
property
(restrictions of use)
Dispossession of
ownership
Duty to tolerate a
culvert or other
hydraulic works
Real damage to
property (loss of
harvest)
Devaluation of
property
(restrictions of use)
Dispossession of
ownership
Duty to tolerate a
culvert or other
hydraulic works
Real damage to
property (e.g., loss
of harvest)
Dispossession of
ownership total or
in part
Harm to another’s
property
Damaged party Property owners
Leaseholders
Tenants
Property owners
Farmers
Users of forestry
land
Property owners
Farmers
Businesses
Property owners
Farmers
Businesses
Property owners
Businesses
Landowners
Holders of special
rights
Relevant principle Equivalence Égalité principle
Protection of
property rights
Protection of
property rights
Equality vis-à-vis
government
encumbrances
Égalité principle
Solidarity principle
Protection of
property rights
expropriation
compensation
Protection of
property rights
Compensation
Legal compensation
regime
Equivalence
plus 10% for home
loss and extra
payments for
businesses and
agricultural owners
in certain
circumstances
Expropriation (for
dispossession)
Compensation for
easement
Égalité principle
Expropriation (for
dispossession)
Compensation of
public easement
(for limitation of
use)
Compensation in
case of public
works damages
Égalité principle
Expropriation (for
dispossession)
Full compensation
for loss caused by
inundation
The right to
property
expropriation
compensation
Expropriation (for
dispossession)
Compensation for
loss caused by
inundation
For dispossession:
expropriation
principles
For damages: tort
law principles
Who benefits from
the loss-causing
measures
Private parties
living and working
in the protected
area
People living and
working in the
surroundings of the
retention area
Private parties
living and working
in the protected
area. The damaged
parties will
probably have no
direct benefits from
this measure.
Private parties
living and working
in the protected
area. The damaged
parties will
probably have no
direct benefits from
this measure.
Private parties
living and working
in the protected
area
Persons in the
protected area.
Damaged parties
will probably have
no direct benefits
from this measure.
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disposition, the loss is not compensated in the name of the public
interest. This is why French public law is always presented as an
unequal law (Cans et al. 2014).  
In Flanders, two causes of loss can be identified: the designation
of the area in a spatial zoning plan and the activation of the
retention area by a project plan. However, devaluation because
of the designation will not be compensated on the basis of the
Decree Integrated Water Policy but may be compensated on the
basis of the general spatial planning legislation (Flemish Code
Spatial Planning) if  the parcel was initially eligible for
construction and this is no longer the case due to the spatial plan
in question (Flemish Spatial Planning Code, art. 2.6.1) (De Smedt
2014). The explicit right of compensation ensuing from the Decree
Integrated Water Policy (art. 17) applies only to farmers and users
of forestry land in case of activation of the designated floodplain.  
The Dutch consider not the factual deed, measure, or
governmental action but the written decision in which the action
or decision is announced as the cause of harm; e.g., in the case
where a restriction of property leads to devaluation of that
property, the spatial zoning plan in which the restriction is
included is considered to be the cause of loss (van Doorn-
Hoekveld 2014). The creation of the retention area is laid down
in a ledger (map) of the regional water authority and a spatial
zoning plan of the municipality. For the devaluation of property,
the injured party may choose which route they want to take to
get compensation: by the regime of the Spatial Planning Act or
by the égalité principle of the Water Act. The project plan based
on the Water Act, which includes the actual “construction” of the
area, can also cause devaluation of property, for which the
regional water authority is competent to compensate. The last is
the real inundation of the area. Only in the last case will full
compensation be granted by the regional water authority (van
Doorn-Hoekveld and Groothuijse 2015). In the case of retention
areas, expropriation is not common.  
In Poland, the competent authority which creates the retention
area (regional director of the Water Management Board) is not
the same as the authority which has to fully compensate the loss
(provincial governor). However, if  the property is only partially
occupied, or the owner cannot use the remaining part of the
property for their purposes, the owner can oblige the Public
Treasury to purchase the whole property. There is a wide approach
on devaluation of property. It includes not only the physical
damage to property but also opportunity costs—loss of potential
benefits. The loss of potential benefits may be—in certain cases
and to a certain extent—taken into account by the experts pricing
the value of property.  
The creation of retention areas is uncommon in Sweden. It should
however be considered that most major rivers in Sweden are
regulated except for the purpose of hydropower production; this
reduces high flows in the spring but may also intensify risks in the
summer and fall (see Thorsteinsson et al. 2007). Johannessen
(2015) has studied flood risk management practices in a highly
flood vulnerable Swedish municipality, and concluded that they
are focused on flood control in the urban area, and thus neglect
opportunities for flood abatement in the river basin through, for
example, the creation of wetlands in upstream forest and farming
areas. The author indicates that while there are compensation
schemes for farmers that manage wet grasslands or create
wetlands, they would not be applicable for flood buffering
services. The creation of a retention area by a public authority
(most likely a municipality) would require a water operations
permit. This would activate the compensation rules that have been
explained in the previous section.
Spatial planning measures (Table 3)
In England, under the planning legislation, there is no right to
compensation in general for the granting or refusal of planning
permission. Equally, no compensation is incurred by the drawing
up of a local plan. There are slightly different rules in relation to
claiming any compensation depending on the type of land or the
rights over the land being acquired, such as residential,
agricultural, or business land, or whether the claimant is an owner,
leaseholder, or mere occupier. Certain categories of owners and
long lessees may claim compensation, even if  their actual land or
rights are not being compulsorily purchased. Residential owner-
occupiers of private property or business premises may claim if
the value of their land is reduced because of the planning
development by serving Blight Notices under Schedule 13 of the
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 on the AA. This requires
the AA to purchase the property at its so-called “Untainted
Value” or the previous value. Others who have their land devalued
due to partial CPOs or due to the use of public works may also
claim for the reduction in value of their land. If  the AA decides
against such compensation or the amount, or refuses to acquire
the property, there are the possibilities of challenges to the Upper
Tribunal, lands chamber. Compensation may include loss of
profits or for goodwill of the business, but each case will depend
on the claimant proving loss (Moore and Purdue 2015).  
In France, the restriction of the right to build or change a building
imposed by a general planning document (Plan Locale
d'urbanisme) or a sectorial planning document (Plan de
Prévention des Risques) is a major cause of preflood harm. In
most cases, these restrictions can cause harm because the property
right is partly limited. The French Parliament has chosen not to
compensate loss caused by an urban planning’s easement (art. L.
105-1 Planning Code). However, the administrative jurisdiction
created an exception in order to allow compensation in very
limited cases (Council of State, 3 July 1998, Bitouzet, n°158592):
when the easement violates an existing situation or acquired
rights, or when it leads to disproportionate loss to the general
interest justifications. In this case, these exceptions have been
translated into the Urban Code, but they are very limited, and
compensation is extremely rare.  
In the Flemish Spatial Implementation Plans (SIPs), the
municipality, province, or region can include prohibitions to build
in specific areas. To compensate this loss in value, planning blight
(loss caused by the alteration of spatial plans) is awarded.
Planning blight is granted when, on the basis of an operational
SIP, a lot is no longer eligible for a permit to build or to parcel,
whereas the day prior to the coming into force of the SIP it was
eligible for a permit to build or to parcel. The plan damage
compensation is due from the authority that made up the SIP that
causes the plan damage. The sum amounts to 80% of the loss in
value. However, this compensation is subject to strict conditions,
and compensation is not always due; e.g., in case of a delimitation
of a riparian zone or a flood area in a SIP, the owner or user of
the property must then choose between the plan loss
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Table 3.. Spatial planning measures.
 
England Flanders France The Netherlands Poland Sweden
Competent
authority for spatial
planning measure
Lead Local Flood
Authorities local
planning authority
and Environment
Agency,
with minister’s
approval
Municipality,
province, region
State
Communes or
intercommunality
bodies
Municipality Municipality Municipal planning
and building
committee
Municipal
assemblies
Competent
authority for
compensation
Acquiring
Authority
The authority that
has drawn up and
issued the spatial
implementation
plans
No compensation,
except in the case of
the illegality of the
spatial planning
measure
Municipality
(probably the water
manager that forced
the municipality to
take this measure
will pay eventually)
Provincial governor Municipality
Cause of loss No compensation
for the actual plan,
only for the flood
works, if  relevant
Spatial
implementation
plan
Local plan
Flood risk
prevention plan
Spatial zoning plan Local spatial zoning
plan
Change or
revocation of a
detail plan during
its implementation
period (5–15 years)
Loss Devaluation of
property
Devaluation of
property: planning
blight is granted
when, on the basis
of a spatial
implementation
plan, a parcel is no
longer eligible to be
built upon, while
the day prior to the
entry into force of
the final spatial
implementation
plan, the parcel was
indeed eligible for a
building permit
(however, eight
exception regimes
apply)
Devaluation of
property (loss of
possibilities to
develop land)
Restriction of
ownership right
Devaluation of
property (loss of
possibilities to
develop land)
Devaluation of
property (loss of
possibilities to
develop land)
Devaluation of
property and other
harm caused by the
measure;
If  the decision
causes the use of
the property to be
significantly
hindered, the
municipality must
redeem the land.
Damaged party Residential owner
occupiers of private
property or
business premises
Private owners
Businesses
Property owners Property owners
Businesses
Property owners
Businesses
Landowners
Holders of special
rights
Legal compensation
regime
Planning blight Compensation for
less value: property
law and égalité (has
to go through
judicial
proceedings)
No legal
compensation
regime because of
the public interest
Égalité principle
(based on the
Spatial Planning
Act)
The right to
property
expropriation
compensation
Expropriation
principles
(exceptions
applicable)
Relevant principle Equivalence
plus 10% for home
loss and extra
payments for
businesses and
agricultural owners
in certain
circumstances
Resent rise of
“equality of citizens
before public
burdens,” but not
absolute
Public interest Égalité principle
Solidarity principle
The right to
property
expropriation
compensation
Protection of
property rights
Compensation
Who benefits from
the measures
Those protected by
the future
restrictions
Long-term benefits
for the community
as a whole
People are
protected in the
future because they
will not be flooded,
but at the moment
they face the
restrictions, they
will not have any
benefits.
People are
protected in the
future because they
will not be flooded,
but at the moment
they face the
restrictions, they
will not have any
benefits.
People are
protected in the
future because they
will not be flooded,
but at the moment
they face the
restrictions, they
will not have any
benefits.
People are
protected in the
future because they
will not be flooded,
but at the moment
they face the
restrictions, they
will not have any
benefits.
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compensation or the duty to buy/duty to compensate pursuant
to Article 17, Decree Integrated Water Policy. The rise of the
égalité principle in environmental and spatial planning law might
provide more traction for compensation, but currently this is not
consolidated in legislation. The ruling of the Constitutional Court
(19 April 2102, 55/2012) is relevant in this respect. The Flemish
government had argued that it is not obliged to compensate for
restrictions to property rights, such as building prohibitions, when
this is done in the public interest. However, the Court stated that
a building permit constitutes a property right in the sense of the
First Protocol to the ECHR. Thus, a building prohibition with
respect to property in a buildable zone constitutes an interference
with the right to the undisturbed enjoyment of the property. The
Court deemed that a lack of compensation in this regard could
not be reasonably justified and was thus in violation of Articles
10 and 11 of the Constitution. Planning blight is important with
respect to the instrument of signal areas (areas in which a
contradiction may occur between the spatial development
perspectives and the interests of the water system). These areas
are not developed and may, due to their natural characteristics,
be beneficial in tackling flood risks but have a “hard destination”
(e.g., building or industrial zones). The measures applicable to
these areas should thus be thoroughly scrutinized and followed
up. The Flemish government has recently reoriented the Rubicon
Fund, which is a public fund created following the 2002 floods to
fund investments in flood risk management, to partly alleviate
the financial burden attached to these signal areas (art. 3 Subsidies
Order of the Flemish Government 2014). Up to 60% of the
amount of compensation in the context of signal areas paid by
the provinces and municipalities can be reimbursed through this
fund. Yet also here, there are strict procedural requirements
(Order of the Flemish Government 2014).  
In Dutch spatial zoning plans, zones in which it is prohibited to
build can be included. In that case, owners of land that cannot
be developed any more in the future can claim the compensation
of planning blight by the competent municipality. This can cause
tension between the municipality that is competent to make
spatial zoning plans and water authorities who ask them to
include these restrictions. If  the restrictions were included in a
water plan of the water authority, the latter would be responsible
for the compensation of loss. However, the municipality could
make an agreement with the water authority that requests the
change in the spatial zoning plan, in which the water authority
would pay the compensation of planning blight instead of the
municipality.  
In Poland, harm caused by restrictions based on a spatial zoning
plan is compensated by an instrument provided by Articles 36
and 37 of the Spatial Planning Act. According to Article 36
paragraph 1 of the Spatial Zoning Plan Act, if, in connection with
the adoption of the local spatial zoning plan or its modification,
use of the property or part of it as usual or compatible with
existing destination has become impossible or significantly
limited, the owner or usufructuary of real estate may demand
compensation from the municipality for actual damage or
purchase of real estate or part thereof. In accordance with Article
36 paragraph 2, implementation of the demand referred to in
paragraph 1 may also be done by offering the municipality to the
owner or usufructuary a replacement property. Article 36
paragraph 3 states that if, in connection with the adoption of the
local spatial zoning plan or its modification, property value has
decreased, and the owner or usufructuary disposes of the property
and did not benefit from the rights referred to in paragraphs 1
and 2, they may require compensation from the municipality for
the amount equal to a decrease in property values.  
Swedish planning and building legislation—mainly the Planning
and Building Act (2010:900)—builds on the principle that
landowners must be compensated only in case of restrictions to
the present land use; they are normally not entitled to
compensation for the loss of values based on expectations of a
change in land use (Bengtsson 2015). Consequently, when change
in the present use of the land is not allowed, for example, when a
person is not allowed to develop an area that is undeveloped, there
is generally no right to compensation. Every municipality must
have a comprehensive plan that establishes the overall land use
for the whole municipality; this plan is not binding (Ch. 3, ss. 1–
3 Planning and Building Act. A cohesive development, for
example, a new urban area, necessitates a so-called “detail plan,”
which is the primary form of legally binding planning in Sweden.
A person who wants to develop an area can initiate the process
for adopting a detail plan, but the municipality ultimately decides
if  the plan will be adopted. A detail plan can create a right (or
sometimes even an obligation) for the municipality to redeem a
certain piece of land; e.g., where a public area will be located,
which in itself  generates an obligation to compensate the
landowner (Ch. 6, s. 13 and Ch. 14, s. 14 Planning and Building
Act). The detail plan also gives the right to develop (i.e., a building
right) under the plan’s implementation period. The landowner
should apply for a building permit during this period. If  the
municipality were to change or revoke a detail plan during that
time, in a way that the landowner can no longer build, the
municipality will have to compensate the loss that this causes the
owner (Ch. 4, s. 39 and Ch. 14, s. 9 Planning and Building Act).
Compensation is determined following the principles in the
Expropriation Act; however, in relation to loss that consists of a
reduction in the market value of the property, values based on
expectations of change in the land use are not to be taken into
account (Ch. 14, ss. 23 and 24 Planning and Building Act. If  the
use of the land is substantially impaired, the landowner may even
request that the land be redeemed (Ch. 14, s. 13 Planning and
Building Act.
Similarities and differences of the compensation regimes
Property rights are protected in all selected countries. However,
every country also recognizes that property rights may be limited.
This limitation must be made by law and serve the public interest,
and a proper compensation must be provided. Therefore, all
countries have an elaborate regime for compensation in case of
expropriation. Only Sweden has a slightly different system, with
the constitutional provision even including certain protection
against restrictions to the use of land and buildings. In all
countries, the compensation of expropriation has a reparative
function: the affected person should be left in a financially similar
position to that before the expropriation. In Sweden, however,
since 2010, the Expropriation Act requires that a 25% supplement
above the market value of the property (in case of total
expropriation) or the reduction in the market value (in case of
partial expropriation) is also granted to the owner. Householders,
businesses, and agricultural owners in England can also obtain
an additional premium. One can wonder whether this can still be
seen as reparative (e.g., Bengtsson 2015).  
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In France, Flanders, and the Netherlands, the égalité principle
can be considered to be one of the principles that form the basis
for compensation of lawfully caused harm. Only in the
Netherlands is this principle extensively elaborated and codified
in legislation. In Flanders, the principle has been applied in case
law, albeit not specifically with respect to preflood loss, and is still
developing. In France, the principle exists but is not used to
compensate preflood damage at all. Where restriction of the use
of property is imposed, the legal instrument of easement must be
used in France as well as in Flanders. In that case, compensation
is provided by the competent authority.  
England, the Flemish region, the Netherlands, and Poland also
have some other regimes in common: the compensation of
planning blight. In these countries, this regime is codified in the
Spatial Planning Act, and in Flanders especially, it is rather
complicated to get compensation for affected parties. In the
Netherlands, this regime is now based on the general égalité
regime. In Poland, a compensation claim needs to be in
accordance with the actual damage of real property.
Explanation of the similarities and differences
The Dutch system of compensation of preflood harm is the most
elaborate of the selected countries. This is likely because it has
been developing over a long period, just as the prevention of flood
risks. In the different regulations, criteria[1] that have to be met
are summed up in order to provide for legal certainty and to assure
a smoother implementation of flood risk measures in a densely
populated country. It should be remembered that flood risk
measures will seldom be possible in sparsely populated and not
intensively used areas, since more than 60% of the Netherlands
is flood-prone and two-thirds of the population lives in these
flood-prone areas (Kaufmann et al. 2016). For flood risk
management, this means that people should be aware that they
live in a flood-prone country that is only habitable thanks to
ongoing investments and maintenance in flood safety. Another
explanation is the strong feeling of (two-sided) solidarity in the
Netherlands. The state provides for safety, and every inhabitant
is paying taxes that aim at keeping the whole country safe, not
only the area of the inhabitant in question. This is clearly visible
in the égalité principle as well: every inhabitant benefits from
actions taken by the state, so every citizen should also bear some
adverse effects of it—also called the normal social risk, but in
case these effects are disproportionately large, they should be
compensated by general means. This fits in the general no-fault
liability compensation regime that is quite generous and has led
to a certain “compensation state of mind” in the Netherlands.  
Despite the fact that Flanders neighbors the Netherlands and
shares many physical similarities, the system is quite different. In
comparison with the Netherlands, flood risk management in
Belgium in general, and Flanders in particular, has not been such
a high priority throughout the past decades. Floods have led to
economic damage in the past but have resulted in a relatively low
number of casualties (River Basin Management Plan Flemish
Part of the Scheldt River 2016–2021). Similar principles and
compensation regimes exist, but in Flanders, these have been
developed only for preflood harm in recent times, through certain
high-level judgment with precedence value. This is also connected
to developments in the insurance system: compensation in
Belgium entails ex post loss—so, after a flood has occurred. For
ex post damage, solidarity is one of the cornerstones of the
compensation regime. Since the amendment to the Insurance Act
through the Act of 17 September 2005,[2] ex post compensation
has been transferred from the public sphere to the private
insurance market (Suykens et al., 2016). Coverage for floods is
automatically and mandatorily included in the fire insurance.
Although fire insurance, as such, is not obligatory in Flanders,
90–95% of the households have taken it up. All citizens thus
contribute to the flood coverage, although buildings in high-risk
zones built after 23 September 2008 might not benefit from caps
set on insurance premiums by the Tariff  Office. The
governmentally administered Disaster Fund functions as a
fallback mechanism in case, among other things, insurance
thresholds have been exceeded.  
The solidarity principle is also very important in France, but
contrary to the Netherlands, it is connected to ex post
compensation. This can be explained by the constitutional
principle to compensate people for loss sustained by a disaster
(paragraph 12 Preamble of the 1946 French Constitution). The
following égalité and solidarity principle were thus connected to
ex post loss instead of ex ante loss. Because the current form of
flood risk management dates from the 1980s, the development of
the compensation regime based on the French Constitution is
disconnected from the idea of prevention but is linked to ex post
compensation instead (Debates of the National Constituent
Assembly of 1946, Pontier 1983, Borgetto 1993). The CAT-NAT
regime (n°82–200, 1982), is a public–private partnership, as there
is a hybrid insurance system associating insurance companies,
which raise the additional insurance premium dedicated to
natural disasters. The state ensures the solvency of the system.
Insured people have to pay an additional premium, even if  they
are not facing any natural risk. Just as in Belgium, where there is
a private insurance scheme with a public fallback mechanism, this
public–private system is used only for ex post compensation. It is
not connected to preflood compensation because obligations
enforced by the French administration are traditionally
considered as a public utility easement that cannot be
compensated.  
England is a country in which historically the responsibility of
citizens for themselves, with little interference by the state, is an
important notion. This is also the reason that there is an
elaborated insurance system available for flood risks. In contrast
to Flanders and France, this is part of the private market (Wiering
et al. 2015).  
The physical characteristics of Sweden differ from those of the
other countries. The country has been relatively spared from
floods with catastrophic consequences (MSB 2012). Individuals
are primarily responsible for the protection of their property;
municipalities can take action where it is in the local public interest
(Andersson 2009). It is only in recent decades that the issues of
flood and flood risk management have begun moving up on the
national political agenda, not in the least as a result of increasing
awareness of climate change effects (Ek et al. 2016a). The legal
framework corresponds to the historical and present flood risk
situation in Sweden, but there is reason to suspect that it could
be challenged by a future where increasing public action for
preventive flood risk management is needed.  
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Poland historically differs from the other countries. This is a
country in transition after being Communist for decades. One of
the most crucial values of the Polish Constitution of 1997 (after
four decades of unlawful expropriation without compensation
during the People’s Republic of Poland) is the protection of
private property. Now, therefore, only drastic situations such as
the State of Natural Disaster or the measures involved in
protecting against such a state can justify not only compensation
for unlawfully caused harm but also compensation for lawfully
caused loss. The system of compensating lawfully caused loss is
still developing.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The explanation of the differences and similarities of the
researched compensation regimes consists of multiple aspects.  
Geographical differences are of great importance. The difference
between Flanders, England, and the Netherlands, on the one
hand, and Sweden, on the other, is significant. In densely
populated areas, flood risk management measures are more likely
to interfere with rights of private parties than in vast areas with
a substantial degree of open space.  
However, differences also appear in geographically quite similar
countries; e.g., England, Flanders, and the Netherlands. These
differences have a legal explanation; it can be found in the
principles that underlie the whole legal system of a country,
namely, (compulsory) one-sided solidarity versus private
responsibility. Again, the Netherlands can be placed on one side
of the spectrum, as solidarity plays a very important role in flood
risk management as well as preflood loss. All Dutch inhabitants
contribute to keeping the country habitable, and closely connected
to this, to compensation for the loss of some. On the other side
of the spectrum, one can find England, with a deep respect for
private responsibility, and a historical and political attitude of
encouragement of private responsibility and the restriction as
much as possible of interference by the state. The differences
between Flanders, France, and the Netherlands are of interest
since these three also have the solidarity principle as well as the
égalité principle in common, but these are applied differently. In
France, solidarity is connected more to ex post compensation than
to preflood compensation in which the protection of property
rights plays a more important role because of the development
of the constitutional principle of solidarity, which is connected
to disasters instead of prevention. In Flanders, the general
compensation regime, through recent case law, is developing
toward a system that is more similar to Dutch preflood
compensation, in which the égalité principle is leading. However,
the protection of property rights still plays an important role in
preflood compensation, and the solidarity principle plays an
especially significant role in post-flood compensation. Flanders
still has quite a long way to go before the égalité principle becomes
a fully fledged and across-the-board doctrine with respect to
preflood compensation.  
Property rights are protected in all the selected countries, but in
England, Poland, and Sweden, they seem to carry comparatively
more weight in preflood compensation. All countries pay full
compensation in the case of a breach of property rights; e.g,
dispossession. In England and Sweden, extra compensation can
be offered in specific cases as well, which makes their “rigid”
preflood compensation regime more generous than that of the
other countries, in which in more cases compensation might be
awarded, even though “overcompensation” is exceptional. Of
note is that this increased protection of property rights in the case
of expropriation and similar measures is a recent development in
Sweden.  
In conclusion, the explanation of the differences and similarities
is multifaceted. Geographical aspects as highly flood vulnerable
and densely populated countries and the consequent substantial
interference with private rights makes compensation regimes
more elaborate. The principles that underlie the compensation
regimes are also an important explanatory factor. The dominance
of the solidarity principle versus the protection of property rights
leads to different compensation regimes. Poland is different in
many ways, mainly because of its Communist history and the
development of a relatively new compensation regime based on
the protection of property rights.  
Compensating the loss of some leads to more equity, in the sense
that the burdens of preflood measures are fairly spread in society.
It also leads to an increase of legitimacy. By awarding damages,
authorities show that the distributional effects and therefore the
interests of the injured parties are thus weighed in the decision-
making process. This is especially the case when the competent
authority of the loss-causing decision is the same as the one that
is competent to decide over the compensation.  
We have made a start at filling the knowledge gap concerning the
specific distributional effect of “harm caused by preflood risk
management measures.” By looking not only at the compensation
regimes in general, but also at three concrete measures, we have
painted the picture of how distributional effects are dealt with in
the selected countries. The legal comparison method enables us
to analyze the differences and similarities between the countries,
and to explain them. After identifying the similarities and
differences of these systems and their explanation, research can
be further developed. An important next step in research on
distributional effects can be to examine the connection between
preflood and postflood compensation and the explanation as to
why one system is chosen in relation to dominant national flood
risk management strategies in various countries.  
We suggest that distributional effects do not appear only after
floods have already occurred, but also in the preventive phase of
flood risk management, especially in countries with a strong focus
on the prevention of floods; e.g., the Netherlands, where no major
flood has occurred in the last decades because of an effective
preventive flood risk management system, in contrast with, for
example, Poland. It can be expected that the legitimacy of
preflood measures will be increased by, among other things, a
well-developed compensation regime. This specific aspect of
preflood compensation needs further multidisciplinary research.
We also show that other disciplines—for example, economics—
should take into account not only the costs of preventive measures
but also the loss and the compensation thereof, in order to get a
comprehensive overview of the costs and benefits of a specific
flood risk management system. Because of its value to the equity,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of flood risk management, the aspect
of preflood compensation can be considered to be the backbone
of good preventive flood risk management.  
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[1] General criteria of the égalité principle in the Netherlands are,
among others, the normal social risk, special burden, and risk
acceptability (Tjepkema 2010).
[2] Act of 17 September 2005 on the insurance of natural disasters
modifying the Insurance Act of 25 June 1992 and the Act of 12
July 1976 on compensation of damages to goods as a result of
natural disasters, Belgian Official Journal of 11 October 2005
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